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Abstract
Vertical linkages accounts for a large proportion of the volume of inter-
mediate inputs used in an industry. This paper analyses the role played
by vertical linkages on the e¤ects of trade liberalization on technology
adoption and their consequences on average productivity and welfare in
a trade model with heterogeneous rms. We nd that the strength of
vertical linkages shapes the e¤ects that trade liberalization produces on
rmssurvival and technology upgrading decisions, having an impact on
the average productivity of the economy and, ultimately, on welfare.
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1 Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the birth of a rich literature that theoreti-
cally and empirically shows that rm heterogeneity is the key to understanding
the impact of trade liberalization policies on an industrys average productiv-
ity. According to this literature, trade increases average productivity due to a
reallocation e¤ect that operates through a selection mechanism (trade expels
the less e¢ cient rms out of the market and reallocates production factors to-
wards the most e¢ cient units (Melitz, (2003)) and through a within plant e¤ect
(providing rms with incentives to upgrade their productivity (Bustos (2011),
Lileeva and Treer (2010) and Unel (2013)).1 Both sources, selection and plant
productivity growth, have been found to be empirically relevant when exam-
ining the impact of trade liberalization on an industrys average productivity
(Pavnick (2002),Treer, (2004), Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen (2011)).
While the rst branch of this literature has focused exclusively on rms
heterogeneity in export activities, a very recent avenue points out that this
dimension is far more complex with industries heavily relying on vertical linkages
and the use of intermediate inputs. In this literature importing intermediate
inputs also plays an important role in determining the ultimate e¤ect of trade
on average productivity (Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Halpern, Koren and
Szeidl (2015)). This paper contributes to the literature by examining the impact
of trade liberalization policies on average productivity and ultimately welfare in
an environment where rms are interconnected by vertical linkages because they
use as intermediate inputs goods supplied by other domestic and foreign rms
and they are allowed to technology upgrade, which is a relatively unexplored
channel in the literature.
Intermediate inputs allow rms to become connected in such a way that a
shock that a¤ects the production of one of these inputs is likely to be transmitted
to the production of nal goods thereby generating e¤ects that go beyond the
original ones. In addition, if rms use as production factors for the intermediate
input sector a share of the production of nal goods, this creates a multiplier
e¤ect that could, in principle, enlarge rmsinnovation prots generated by a
process of trade liberalization. This could provide rms with larger incentives
to engage in R&D activities enhancing innovation. Yet, this comes with a
double side: the multiplier e¤ect could intensify rmscompetition for scarce
production factors in such a way that their prices would be driven up, reducing
operating prots and, eventually, deterring rms from adopting more productive
technologies.
Our paper is motivated by the fact that vertical linkages not only bring in
new channels that could modify the link between trade liberalization, productiv-
ity and welfare, but also by the recognition that they are empirically relevant.
1See also the seminal work by Atkeson and Burstein (2010) and a more recent contribution
by Impulliti and Licandro (2012).
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Indeed, intermediate inputs constitute a fundamental part of the production
structure of an open economy. Recent studies nd that around 50 to 60% of
total gross output is accounted for intermediate inputs.2 Intermediates are also
responsible for a large share of the total volume of international trade with the
World Trade Report 2014 (p. 43) stating that "the average import content of
exports is around 25 per cent and increasing over time and almost 30 per cent
of merchandise trade is now in intermediate goods or components". Moreover,
Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) use input-output tables from the UNIDO
Industrial Statistics Database for a panel of 28 manufacturing industries over
55 developed and developing countries and they nd that the largest part of the
volume of intermediate inputs consumed by a manufacturing industry comes
from inputs produced by the same industry, although sectors di¤er substan-
tially in the extent to which they use them. These ndings not only reinforce
the idea that industry-specic vertical linkages are relevant at the sectoral level,
but also suggest that di¤erences in the strength of vertical linkages can result
in di¤erences in export behavior or technology upgrading across industries.
To analyze the role played by vertical linkages in determining the e¤ects of
trade liberalization on innovation, productivity and welfare, we construct a trade
model with heterogeneous rms that are interconnected by vertical linkages in
such a way that all rms can employ, as intermediate inputs, the nal goods
produced by both domestic and foreign exporting rms, as in Krugman and
Venables (1995). These rms are also allowed to upgrade the current state of
the technology they use by reducing their marginal cost to be a xed proportion
 of its initial value, bearing a xed cost of adoption of fI units of the nal good,
as in Bustos (2011) among others. While simple, this framework is consistent
with the stylized fact that many rms within an industry do not engage in R&D
activities (Klette and Kortum (2004)).
Our results suggest that the strength of vertical linkages shapes the e¤ects
that trade liberalization produces on rmssurvival and technology upgrading
decisions, having an impact on the average productivity of the economy and,
ultimately, on welfare. The model exhibits di¤erent type of equilibria depending
on the parameter conguration, which are related to di¤erent hierarchies among
adopters, exporters and domestic rms. Specically, if innovating is an expen-
sive activity relative to exporting, the most productive rms engage in both
innovation and exporting, the less productive ones serve the domestic market
using their original technology and the rms in the middle rank export using
their original technology.3 If, instead, exporting is relatively more expensive, the
rms in the middle rank adopt the new technology but do not export.4 Finally,
for intermediate trade costs, an equilibrium in which rms are innovators and
2See, for instance, Jones (2010, 2011).
3This equilibrium, analysed in depth by Bustos (2011), is consistent with the empirical
evidence provided in the same paper.
4Castellani and Zanfei (2007) nds that a non-negligible proportioon of the italian manu-
facturing rms are domestic innovators. This equilibrium is consistent with this evidence.
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exporters or only domestic rms may exist.5 The e¤ects of trade liberalization
on technology upgrading will vary with the intensity of vertical linkages and
across equilibria (when the intensity is either low or high). For intermediate
levels, however, the results are common across equilibria: trade liberalization
promotes technology upgrading when the intensity is intermediate-low and de-
ters technology upgrading when it is intermediate-high.
These results on innovation and productivity have a clear impact on the
e¤ects of trade liberalization on welfare. Specically, trade liberalization will
have a positive impact on welfare when the intermediate input intensity is low
or intermediate-low but it will have a negative impact when it is intermediate-
high and high. In the case in which trade liberalization has a positive impact on
welfare, we nd that vertical linkages magnify the e¤ects of trade liberalization
on welfare through its impact on the price of intermediate goods.
This paper is related to di¤erent strands of the literature. The very rst one
is the incipient literature on macroeconomics that explores the consequences of
vertical linkages for explaining cross-country income and productivity di¤erences
(Ciccone (2002), Jones (2011), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005)) or business
cycle transmission (Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009)). Another line of research
in trade also explores the consequences of vertical linkages for aggregate trade
and the impact of trade liberalization on welfare (Helpman and Krugman (1985),
Hummels, Ishii and Yi (2001), Nocco (2012)).6
However, the potential role that these links could play on innovation or
technology adoption has received so far limited attention with some recent ex-
ceptions. These include a recent strand of the literature that has investigated
the complementarity of intermediate inputs and technology adoption (Bas and
Berthou (2013), Boler, Moxnes and Ullveit-Moe (2015)), and the work by Eslava
et al. (2015) who introduce input-output linkages in a quantitative model of
trade and rm heterogeneity in which rms have the option of "quality" up-
grading.7 Specically, in Eslava et al. (2015), trade liberalization promotes
quality upgrading, not only in exporting rms, but also in the most productive
non-exporting rms when most productive rms are assumed to use high qual-
ity intermediate inputs more intensively than low productive ones. However,
while our paper shares with these works a common focus on the role played
by intermediate inputs on the e¤ects of trade liberalization on technology up-
grading, our analysis focuses on aspects absent in their analysis and, as far as
we know, in other previous works. These aspects are the role played by the
strength of vertical linkages and general equilibrium e¤ects in determining the
5See Lileeva and Treer (2010) for evidence supporting this equilibrium.
6Moreover, Lee, Padmanabhan and Whang (1997) have analyzed the so called bullwhip
e¤ect that underlines how small changes in nal demand can cause a big change in the
demand for intermediate goods along the value chain.
7 In Eslava et al. (2015) it is assumed that quality increases not only the marginal utility
of consumers but also the productivity of the rms using these goods as intermediate inputs
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ultimate impact of trade liberalization on productivity and welfare. This is the
reason why in our work we get a more complex set of results, which, for instance,
encompasses some that have the same avour as those in Eslava et al. (2015)
with trade liberalization promoting technology adoption for the most produc-
tive non-exporting rms, even though this happens in our framework only in a
special case, that is when the strength of vertical linkages is middle-low.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure
of the model and its di¤erent equilibria with explicit solutions. Sections 3 and
4, respectively, discuss the e¤ects of trade liberalization on cost cuto¤s and on
welfare. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
Let us consider a world in which there are two symmetric countries H and
F populated by L individuals endowed with one unit of time that is dedicated
entirely to work. Individuals derive utility from the consumption of two di¤erent
goods, T and M , according to the following Cobb-Douglas functional form
U =
C1 T C

M
(1  )1  0 <  < 1
where the parameter  represents the proportion of expenditure dedicated to the
good M . The good T is a homogenous good, produced with a linear technology
(i.e. one unit of labour is required to produce one unit of output) under perfect
competition and freely traded. In contrast, M is a di¤erentiated good and
individuals derive utility from a continuum of varieties (indexed by j 2 
)
according to the following specication
CM =
0@Z
j

C" (j)
 1
 dj
1A  1
where  > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution and C" (j) denotes the
individual consumption of variety j.
Each variety in the economy is produced by a single rm in a monopolistic
competition environment. Unlike Melitz (2003), rms combine labour and a
set of di¤erentiated intermediate inputs to produce their variety using a Cobb-
Douglas technology. More precisely, the rm producing the j   th variety uses
the following technology
q (j) =
1
a(j)
L(j)1 M(j)
8We will dene this in the paper as Equilibrium B.
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where q (j) is the quantity produced and a(j) represents the unit input require-
ments of rm j, obtained combining L(j) units of labour and M(j) units of the
di¤erentiated intermediate inputs, and it is an inverse measure of the productiv-
ity level of the rm. Since  2 (0; 1) is the intermediate share and determines
the importance of intermediate inputs in the production of the nal good, it
also represents the strength of vertical linkages.
Following Krugman and Venables (1995) and Nocco (2012) among others,
and consistent with the empirical observation in Di Giovanni and Levchenko
(2009), we assume that there are vertical linkages so rms are using part of the
production of the nal di¤erentiated good M as an intermediate input. The
intermediate composite good used by each rm j is therefore given by
M(j) =
0@Z
l

Bj(l)
 1
 dl
1A  1  > 1
where Bj(l) denotes the amount of good l used as intermediate input by the
rm producing variety j.
To enter into a market a rm needs to invest fE units of labour to create a
new variety (product innovation). At the moment of entry, the rm is uncertain
regarding its productivity although the rm knows that its unit input require-
ment a(j) follows a Pareto Distribution with the cumulative density function
given by G(a) =

a
aM

with 0  a  aM and shape parameter   1. After
entry, the productivity is revealed to the rm and the rm has the option to
leave or stay in the market. Firms that produce must incur a per period xed
cost of operation fD in terms of the di¤erentiated nal good.
Once the rm stays, it has the possibility to export to the foreign market.
Exporting, however, entails both xed and variable trade costs. More precisely,
exporters need to incur a per period xed cost of exporting fX in terms of
the di¤erentiated nal good and a variable trade cost of the iceberg type so
that   1 units of the good have to be shipped from the production country
in order to sell one unit in the foreign country. At this stage, we depart from
Nocco (2012) assuming that the rm can simultaneously decide to adopt a more
e¢ cient Hicks-neutral technology which reduces the marginal cost of production
to be a proportion  of the original value a(j), with 0 <   1, so that the
unit input requirement of the composite good of rm j that innovates is a(j).
Adopting the most e¢ cient technology bears a cost of fI units in terms of the
nal di¤erentiated good.9
9Following the notation of Baldwin and Forslid (2004), the parameters fD , fX and fE are,
respectively, the discounted value of the xed cost of producing for the domestic country, for
export and entry. These elements consequently are the equivalent to fD , fX and fE in
Melitz (2003). Moreover, fI is the discounted value of the xed cost of innovation.
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We assume that the homogenous good is the numeraire. This, together with
the assumption of perfect competition, the linear technology (with unit input
requirement equal to one) and zero trade cost assumed for this good, imply that
the equilibrium wage is equal to one in both countries (w = 1). Finally, as it
is common in the literature in trade and rm heterogeneity, and to keep the
analysis tractable, the paper focuses on the case of symmetric economies (i.e.
H and F exhibit identical parameter values, and therefore the solutions for the
endogenous variables are symmetric).
2.1 Equilibrium
Solving the consumersutility maximization problem, the demand function for
variety j in the nal good sector in each country is given by
C(j) =
p(j) 
P 1 M
I
where I represents the aggregate income of the country, p(j) the price of variety j
and PM = [
NZ
0
p(l)1 dl]
1
1  is the price index of the set of all theN di¤erentiated
varieties bought in the country, which includes both domestically produced and
imported varieties.
To obtain the total demand function that each rm faces we need to specify
the di¤erent components of it. Specically, a rm can produce to satisfy the
demand of both domestic and foreign consumers and rms. In general, the
quantity produced in H by rm j is given by the following expression
q(j) = CD(j) +BHDN (j) +BHDI(j) +BHXN (j) +BHXI(j) +
+ (CX(j) +BFDN (j) +BFDI(j) +BFXN (j) +BFXI(j))
where:  =  if the rm exports and 0 otherwise; CD(j) and CX(j), respectively,
denote the demand for variety j for domestic and foreign consumption; the vari-
able Bvsm(j) indicates the demand for variety j used as an intermediate input
by rms producing in country v = H;F for their domestic market (obtained
when s = D) and to export to the other country (when s = X). Note that,
within each case, the model distinguishes between the demand of the adopters
of the most e¢ cient technology (when m = I) and the non-adopters (when
m = N) since the unit input requirements are di¤erent across the two cases.
An analogous expression holds for the quantity produced by rm j producing
in F .
A rms demand for a variety used as an intermediate input is obtained by
applying Shepards lemma to its total cost function. In general terms, the total
cost function of rm  is given by
TC() = PM (fD + fX + fI + 
a()q)
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where the variable  takes value one if the rm exports and zero otherwise, while
 takes the value one if the rm innovates and zero otherwise. The demand of
rm  for each variety j is, thus, given by B(j)
B(j) =
@TC()
@p(j)
= 
p(j) PM
P 1 M
 
fD + fX + fI + 
a()q

=
=
p(j) 
P 1 M
TC()
Notice that rms behave monopolistically and so the price that rm j charges
in the domestic market is
pDm(j) =


   1

a(j)PM
In the case in which rm j exports, the price that it sets abroad is pXm(j) =
pDm(j). Thus, exporting rms set higher prices abroad and rms adopting the
most e¢ cient technology charge lower prices in both markets.
In each country the total value of the expenditure in the di¤erentiated man-
ufactured varieties E is given by the sum of the share of consumersincome, I,
and of the share of the total cost of production spent on intermediates, TC,
i.e. E = I + TC. Equilibrium aggregate production for each variety j is,
consequently, given by
q(j) = (1 + )

pDm(j)
 
P 1 M

E
where   1  denotes the freeness of trade with its value ranging from zero
when iceberg trade costs are prohibitively high to one when they are null.
A rms operating prots with unit input requirement a(j) are then given
by
(j) = (1 + )(1 )a(j)1 
where  

E
(PM )(1 )(1 )


 1
1 
captures aggregate variables and para-
meters a¤ecting rmsdemand and. In the case when  > 0, this term also
includes parameters a¤ecting its production cost levels. (1 ) denotes a mea-
sure of the e¢ ciency gains obtained by the rm when it adopts the most e¢ cient
technology (when  = 1), with larger gains obtained for smaller values of .10
A rm with unit input requirement a (j) decides to upgrade its state of
technology when the benets of adopting the new technology expressed in terms
of larger operating prots overcome the costs of doing so, that is when
(1 + )
 
1    1 a(j)1  > fIPM
10As smaller values of  imply larger values of (1 )
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with the sign of equality holding if the rm is indi¤erent between adopting or not
adopting the new technology. Its unit input requirements, aI , will be denoted
as the innovation cuto¤.
A rm decides to export if the operating prots obtained from the foreign
market overcome the xed cost of exporting, that is if
(1 )a(j)1  > fXPM
with the sign of equality holding if the rm is indi¤erent between exporting or
not. The indi¤erent exporter is called the marginal exporter and its unit input
requirement is denoted by aX .
The rm that is indi¤erent between staying or leaving the market must
satisfy the following condition
(1 )a1 D = fDP

M
where aD denotes its unit input requirements.
Note that if a rm nds it protable to adopt the new technology just con-
sidering the domestic market (((1 )  1)a1  > fIPM ), then this rm must
adopt the same technology if it decides to export. This implies that there cannot
be simultaneously in an equilibrium domestic rms adopting the most e¢ cient
technology and exporters relying on their original technology.
Depending on the parameter congurations, this model exhibits three di¤er-
ent types of equilibria.11 Moreover, di¤erent types of equilibria are associated
with di¤erent rm hierarchies regarding export and innovation activities.
If innovating is an expensive activity relative to exporting, that is if the
following condition holds
fI
(1    1)


1 + 

> fX > fD,
rms will be sorted according to the following status: innovating exporters (the
most productive ones), non innovating exporters with intermediate productivity
levels and domestic rms. In this equilibrium, technology adoption is a rela-
tively expensive activity (compared to exporting) and only a subset of the most
productive exporters are willing to innovate. We denote this equilibrium by A.
If, instead, exporting is a relatively expensive activity the following condition
holds
fX >
fI
(1    1)
1  > 1 fD;
11See Navas and Sala (2015) for a complete characterization of all types of equilibria in a
model without vertical linkages. The existence of vertical linkages does not alter the conditions
determining the parameter conguration associated with each type of equilibria. This comes
from the fact that external linkages a¤ect both export and innovation activities in a similar
way as they a¤ect the production for the domestic market given that all xed costs are using
intermediates with the same intensity.
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and rms are grouped according to the following categories: exporting innova-
tors, non exporting innovators and domestic rms. We denote this equilibrium
by B.
Finally, there is another case for intermediate trade costs in which rms do
not nd it protable to innovate if they do not export and viceversa. More pre-
cisely, this equilibrium is sustained when the following parameter conguration
holds
fI
(1    1)

(1 + )
 fX  fI
(1    1)
1 :
In this equilibrium rms are sorted according to two di¤erent types: innovators
that export or just domestic rms. We denote this equilibrium by C.
In the following subsections we characterize the di¤erent equilibrium con-
ditions for each type of equilibrium. We denote the respective cost cuto¤s
associated with each equilibrium with the superscript i = fA;B;Cg.
2.1.1 Equilibrium A
In equilibrium A every rm that innovates is an exporter but only a subset of
the most productive exporters innovate. Consequently the conditions dening
the three cost cuto¤s ranked as aAI < a
A
X < a
A
D , explained above, are given by
(1 + )A(1    1)  aAI 1  = fI  PAM (1)
A
 
aAX
1 
= fX
 
PAM

(2)
A
 
aAD
1 
= fD
 
PAM

(3)
A rms decision to adopt the new technology, is a¤ected by the presence
of vertical linkages through two channels. The rst one a¤ects clearly a rms
demand through A. In a model without vertical linkages, total expenditure
includes only domestic and foreign consumer expenditure. In this model, how-
ever, total expenditure is determined not only by consumer expenditure but also
by each rms demand for varieties used as intermediates. In principle, rms
can rely on more incentives to adopt the most e¢ cient technology since market
size is larger. The existence of vertical linkages also has an impact on the rms
marginal costs of production, having an impact on global sales and operating
prots through the price index PM a¤ecting A when  > 0. This second chan-
nel, which is absent in a model without vertical linkages, also a¤ects the cost of
adoption. As the xed costs of adoption involve the use of intermediates, any
change in the cost of intermediates a¤ects the adoption cost.
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Using (1) and (3), the proportion of surviving rms which adopt the most
e¢ cient technology is obtained as
NAI
NAD
=

aAI
aAD

=

(1 + )(1    1)fD
fI
 
 1
(4)
where NAI and N
A
D are, respectively, the number of innovating and surviving
rms.
Using (2) and (3) the proportion of surviving rms exporting is
NAX
NAD
=

aAX
aAD

=

fD
fX
 
 1
(5)
with NAX denoting the number of exporting rms.
2.1.2 Equilibrium B
In equilibrium B, the rm that is indi¤erent between innovating or staying
with the original technology is a domestic rm and all exporters are in fact
innovators, with the three cost cuto¤s ranked as aBX < a
B
I < a
B
D. In this case
the following conditions hold
1 B
 
aBX
1 
= fX
 
PBM

(1    1)B  aBI 1  = fI  PBM
B
 
aBD
1 
= fD
 
PBM

Similar conclusions relative to the impact of vertical linkages on the decision
of adopting the most e¢ cient technology can be extracted. Analogous to the
previous equilibrium, the proportion of surviving rms exporting or adopting
the most e¢ cient technology are, respectively, given by
NBX
NBD
=

aBX
aBD

=

1 fD
fX
 
 1
(6)
and
NBI
NBD
=

aBI
aBD

=
" 
1    1 fD
fI
# 
 1
(7)
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2.1.3 Equilibrium C
In equilibrium C, the set of innovators and exporters coincide. The rm which is
indi¤erent between innovating or relying in the original technology knows that
if it does not innovate, it wont be able to export and viceversa. Consequently,
that rm evaluates the benets of jointly innovate and export instead of relying
with the original technology and remain domestic. The two resulting cuto¤s
are ranked as follows aCI < a
C
D, where a
C
I denotes the unit input requirements
associated with that rm. The conditions associated with this equilibrium are
given by the following expressions
C [(1 + )(1 )   1]  aCI 1  = (fI + fX)  PCM :
Ca1 D = fD
 
PCM

Dividing them and rearranging terms, the proportion of incumbents which in-
novate and export is given by:
NCX
NCD
=
NCI
NCD
=

aCI
aCD

=
(
(1 + )1    1 fD
fI + fX
) 
 1
(8)
Note that the presence of vertical linkages does not have an impact on the
productivity distribution conditional on entry in any of the three equilibria, (i.e.
the proportion of surviving rms adopting the most e¢ cient technology or ex-
porting is unchanged by the presence of vertical linkages). This is the result of
both channels a¤ecting symmetrically the variable prots of innovating, export-
ing and staying in the market. This can be observed by looking at conditions
(4) and (5) in equilibrium A, (6) and (7) in equilibrium B and (8) in equilib-
rium C and noting that neither i nor
 
P iM

are a¤ecting these proportions.12
However, the presence of vertical linkages has interesting implications for the
survival productivity cut-o¤ having a clear impact on the technology adoption
cut-o¤ and, ultimately, the average industry productivity and the welfare of the
economy.
2.2 Solution
An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by a vector of productivity cut-
o¤s (aiI ; a
i
X ; a
i
D), and a vector of aggregate variables (P
i
M ; E
i; N iD; N
i
X ; N
i
I) that
satisfy the specic equations associated with each equilibrium described above,
the market clearing conditions for each good and the Free Entry condition.
12Given that the expression for P iM is di¤erent across equilibria because it depends on 
i
dened in the following subsection, i changes across equilibria and it should therefore be
changed accordingly.
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The conditions derived in each of the equilibria above reveals that aiI , a
i
X
can be expressed as a function of aiD. The value of a
i
D can be obtained as in the
Melitz (2003) model using the Zero Prot condition (ZP) and the Free Entry
condition (FE). The ZP condition is given by
i
 
aiD
1 
= fD
 
P iM

(9)
and the FE is given by
i = PMfD
i +
fE
G(aiD)
; i = A;B;C:
where i represents average operating prots, i 
h
1 +
G(aiI)
G(aiD)
fI
fD
+
G(aiX)
G(aiD)
fX
fD
i
and, in the specic case of equilibrium C, the cuto¤s are such that aCX = a
C
I .
The free entry condition states that average expected operating prot of active
producers must be equal to their expected xed cost PMfD
i - which is given
by the sum of PMfD, plus P

MfI times the probability of being an innovator
(conditional on it being a producer), plus PMfX times the probability of being
an exporter (again, conditional on it being a producer) - plus the expected cost
of developing a successful entrant, that is fE=G(aiD).
Specically, the term i represents the expected total xed cost of producing,
exporting and innovating relative to the expected xed costs of a surviving rm
that just serves the domestic market. This variable will help us to characterize
the survival productivity cut-o¤ and the expression for the relevant aggregate
variables across the di¤erent types of equilibria.
Given that i = ri=, where ri represents the average revenues, substituting
ri = Ei=ND, we nd that the free entry condition can be rewritten as
Ei
ND
=
 
P iM

fD
i +
fE
G(aiD)
(10)
To solve the model, an expression for the aggregate price index P iM and one for
total expenditure Ei must be obtained. Using their denitions we obtain:
P iM =


   1a
i
D
 1
(1 )


   1
 1
(1 )(1 )  
N iD
 1(1 )(1 )  
i
 1
(1 )(1 ) (11)
Ei = L+ 
 
P iM

N iDfD

1 +
(   1)
  (   1)

i (12)
where    1 > 1.13 Conditions (9)-(12) characterize a system of equations in
4 endogenous variables (aiD; P
i
M ; N
i
D and E
i). Solving the system we nd that:
aiD =
"
L
0fD


   1
1 # 
aMfE
fD
(   1)
i
 1 

(13)
13This condition is required to have the price index P iM converging to a positive value.
13
P iM =
"
L
0fD


   1
1 #   
aMfE
fD
(   1)
i
 1

N iD =

 1



 1
( 1) 
L
0fD


 1
1 ( 1)+(1 )
h
fE
fD
(   1) aM
i 1 
i
  1
where   (   1) (+ )    and 0  (   1) + (1   ) > 0. Note
that  is positive when  2 [0; 1) and negative when  2 (1; 1), with 1 
=(   1) < 1, while i is given by:
i =
8>>>><>>>>:
1 + 

fX
fD
1 
+
 
1    1 (1 + )  fIfD 1  if i = A
1 +
 
1 
  fX
fD
1 
+
 
1    1  fIfD 1  if i = B
1 +

(1 + ) 1    1  fX+fIfD 1  if i = C
(14)
Note that with any change in trade costs (variable or xed), the e¢ ciency
gains from innovation, ; and its xed cost have an impact on the survival cost
cut-o¤ through the variable i. Observing the equilibrium expression above one
can conclude that i can be interpreted as an indicator of trade openness and
innovation opportunities generated by the levels of international integration and
the conditions characterizing the innovative environment in the industry. Higher
i (i.e. lower variable trade costs, larger e¢ ciency gains from innovation and/or
lower xed costs of exporting or innovating) has contrasting e¤ects: from one
side it expands the business opportunities of the most productive rms (near
the highest marginal cuto¤s), but from the other side it endures competition for
every rm toughening the conditions for surviving in the market. Eventually,
this implies a more selective industry.
The analysis of (14) reveals that i is not a¤ected by the existence of vertical
linkages. Vertical linkages, however, play an interesting role on the e¤ects on
the survival productivity cut-o¤ and on welfare through the price index P iM .
3 The impact of an increase in economic inte-
gration on cost cuto¤s.
The table below summarizes and represents with the arrows the e¤ects of a
trade liberalization policy, that consists of a reduction in variable trade costs
(and thus increases ), on the di¤erent productivity cuto¤s.
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Equilibrium A Equilibrium C Equilibrium B
aAD a
A
I a
C
D a
C
I a
B
D and a
B
I
0 <  < 0 # " # " #
0 <  < 1 " " " " "
1 <  < 
i
2 # # # # #
i2 <  < 1 # Case 1 Case 2# " #
Case 1 Case 2
# " #
Table I: The e¤ects of increases in  on the cuto¤s aiD and a
i
I .
In the table: 0   1 , 1   1 , i2 is equal to A2  (
A (1+))
(1 )+(+)(A 1)
for Equilibrium A and it is equal to C2   C for Equilibrium C. We show
how the values of i2 can be determined in the Appendix where we derive also
the signs of the derivatives @a
i
D
@ and
@aiI
@ used to establish the e¤ects of increases
in  on the cuto¤s. Notice that for Equilibria A and C di¤erent e¤ects are pro-
duced by trade liberalization only on aAI and a
C
I when vertical linkages are very
large, that is when i2 <  < 1, and that for Equilibrium B there is no threshold
B2 as a unique case occurs for  > 1.
The baseline case, that is the one without vertical linkages ( = 0), has the
same qualitative e¤ects as those described by the rst row in the table above
with low intensity of vertical linkages. Specically, in the case without verti-
cal linkages, trade liberalization increases i and, in the equilibria A and C, it
increases the proportion of surviving rms that undertake technology adoption
through an expansion in their business opportunities due to better access to the
foreign market. However, the increase in i produced by trade liberalization re-
duces the aggregate price index P iM , and this has a negative impact in the global
sales of the rm through a competition e¤ect as the reduction in variable trade
costs reduces the price of imported varieties and facilitates the access of foreign
rms to the domestic market. As the less productive rms are not exporters
and do not benet from the expansion in their business opportunities abroad,
these e¤ects contribute to a reduction in the rms market share implying a
reduction in the rms survival cuto¤. This is captured by the term
 
P iM
(1 )
(that increases as P iM decreases), when we substitute 
i into condition (9) and
we evaluate it for the case  = 0, 
Ei

 
P iM
(1 )
!

   1
1   
aiD
1 
= fD
Thus, as the increase in i reduces the price index P iM , it implies a reduction
in aiD and a reduction in the proportion of entrants that survive in the market.
Overall, an increase in the freeness of trade ; increases aAI and a
C
I , so a trade
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liberalization policy increases the innovation cost cut-o¤ and the proportion
of entrants undertaking technology adoption. On the contrary, given that in
equilibrium B, the rm that is indi¤erent between adopting or relying in the
original technology does not see its business opportunities expanded with trade,
trade liberalization a¤ects this rm only through its reduction in domestic sales.
Since this rms market size is shrunk, innovation/technology adoption is less
protable and a trade liberalization policy in this case must necessarily decrease
the innovation cost cut-o¤ and the proportion of entrants adopting the most
e¢ cient technology.
Similar results hold when the intensity of vertical linkages is small (0 <  <
0). In this case, substituting i into (9) gives
Ei
 
P iM
(1 )

 
P iM
(1 )     1
1   
aiD
1 
= fD
 
P iM

As stated above, through the existence of vertical linkages, the reduction in the
aggregate price index reduces both production costs, the variable ones (captured
by the term
 
P iM
(1 )
in the left hand side of the equation above) and the
xed operational ones (captured by the element
 
P iM

in the right hand side
of the equation). These two e¤ects have a positive e¤ect on the survival cost
cut-o¤ aiD but this e¤ect is clearly shaped by , the degree of vertical linkages.
In addition the degree of vertical linkages also has a positive e¤ect on each
varietys demand which also increases survival. (This e¤ect is included in the
element Ei in the model). Since  is low, the negative e¤ect on domestic sales
captured by the element
 
P iM
(1 )
in the denominator dominates and overall
survival is lower.
However, these results are challenged when the intensity of vertical linkages
is medium (0 <  < 1). When the intensity of vertical linkages is middle-low,
trade liberalization still reduces the aggregate price index. Nevertheless, in this
case, vertical linkages are strong enough to have a positive impact on survival:
the initial reduction in rmsdomestic sales is dominated by the e¤ect that the
reduction in the aggregate price index has on the rms production costs and the
demand e¤ect. Because production becomes cheaper, the marginal rm nds
it easier to survive. This clearly increases the survival cost cut-o¤ and it has a
double impact on innovation: on the one hand a larger proportion of surviving
rms become innovators (only for equilibria A and C) and, on the other hand,
trade liberalization increases the cuto¤of rms surviving in the market (common
to all the three type of equilibria). Overall the proportion of entrants adopting
the most e¢ cient technology increases after trade liberalization in all equilibria.
This result was not present in a model without vertical linkages.
When the degree of vertical linkages is relatively high 1 <  < 2, the
reverse happens. Not only does an increase in i have a negative impact in the
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cost cut-o¤ (which makes rmssurvival more di¢ cult), but also the e¤ect is
strong enough to reduce the cuto¤ of rms that adopt the most e¢ cient tech-
nology. In this case, trade liberalization is increasing the aggregate price index.
Trade liberalization has an initial negative impact on the price index. Expres-
sion (11) reveals that, holding constant aiD and N
i
D, an increase in 
i reduces
the level of the aggregate price index. This reduces production costs increasing
the demand for intermediate inputs. The degree of vertical linkages is so strong
in this case, that this rise in demand increases the equilibrium price index and
the less productive rms can no longer compensate the increase in the produc-
tion costs with an increase in sales since they only serve the domestic market
and consequently they must leave the market. The industry and the technology
adoption cost cut-o¤s decrease, decreasing both the proportion of entrants that
survive and the proportion of entrants that innovate in all equilibria. This result
is not present in a model without vertical linkages.
In the extreme cases in which  is very high 2 <  < 1, the impact of trade
liberalization on survival and technology adoption depends clearly on the para-
meters of the model. When the economy is in equilibrium A or in equilibrium
C we can distinguish two main cases: one in which trade liberalization deters
technology adoption (Case 1) and one in which trade liberalization promotes
technology adoption (Case 2). Case 1 arises when the initial level of interna-
tional integration is already relatively high (either because the xed cost of
exporting is relatively small or because trade costs are relatively low, or both of
them are small) or when the initial level of international integration is small but
associated with a small xed cost of adoption of a new technology and/or asso-
ciated with large gains in productivity levels associated with the new technology
adopted. In both situations the pressures on demand for goods and intermedi-
ates are already large and a reduction in trade costs puts a lot of pressure on
demand that increases the price index of goods and deters technology adoption.
Case 2, on the contrary, arises when the initial level of international integration
is relatively low (either because the xed cost of exporting is relatively large or
because trade costs are relatively high, or both of them are large) and this is
associated with a high xed cost of adoption of a new technology and/or with
small gains in productivity levels associated with new technology. In this case
the pressures on the demand for goods and intermediates are smaller as initially
fewer rms innovate due to the large cost of technology adoption and/or the
small potential productivity gain. Thus, a larger proportion of very productive
rms would prot from trade liberalization, adopting the new technology even
though the price index of intermediates is rising.
Moreover, the next proposition states interesting parameter congurations
in which the economy is in either case 1 or case 2 independently of the degree
of trade integration:
Proposition 1 In Equilibrium A, if

fX
fD
 1
> +1 1 and
 
1    1 <    1
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or fIfD >
(1  1)2
( 1) 

fX
fD
1 
(+1)
the economy is in case 2 independently of the value
of :
Proof. See Appendix.
Moreover, we can state what follows.
Proposition 2 Consider that the economy is in equilibrium C, then:14
if
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:

fI+fX
fD
 1
>
(21  1)
 1 the economy is in case 2
(1  1)
 1 <

fI+fX
fD
 1
<
(21  1)
 1 the equilibrium of the economy
depends on the value 
fI+fX
fD
 1
<
(1  1)
 1 the economy is in case 1
Proof. See Appendix.
The previous propositions conclude that for cases in which the xed costs
of exporting or innovation are relatively high, trade liberalization will increase
the proportion of rms undertaking technology upgrading when the degree of
vertical linkages are very strong in equilibria A and C. Consequently, the results
suggest that while in case 1, trade liberalization induces tougher selection, and
reduces the proportion of entrants undertaking technology adoption, in case
2 the latter is not so strong and the overall positive e¤ect dominates. This
is consistent with the fact that in case 2 the requirements for innovating and
exporting are so large that very few rms decide to undertake these activities.
This moderates the rise in the demand of intermediate inputs and consequently
the rise in the relative cost of intermediate inputs. The latter has a moderate
impact on the survival productivity threshold and the proportion of technology
upgrading rms.
4 E¤ects on Welfare
The previous section suggests that vertical linkages shape the e¤ect that trade
liberalization has on innovation. In this section we analyze the main implications
of this for welfare. To do so, we rst compare the changes in welfare produced
by trade liberalization in a model in which there are vertical linkages with and
without technology upgrading, and then those in a model in which technology
upgrading is possible with and without vertical linkages. This strategy allows us
to better capture the specic contribution of each channel to the e¤ect of trade
liberalization on welfare. Our main conclusion is that both channels exacerbate
the impact of trade liberalization on welfare and for the case of vertical linkages
14All of the conditions considered are consistent with the economy being in equilibrium C.
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the ultimate e¤ect of trade liberalization on welfare depends crucially on the
intensity of vertical linkages ().
Substituting the optimal values for CT and CM ; the indirect utility function
can be expressed as
U =
L 
P iM

Thus, as it is standard in this literature, to evaluate the impact of trade liberal-
ization on welfare it is useful to see how the aggregate price index changes with
respect to changes in trade policy.
The following proposition states that trade liberalization has a positive e¤ect
on welfare if and only if the degree of vertical linkages are not too strong.
Proposition 3 Trade liberalization has a positive impact on welfare when 0 
 < 1:
Proof. See Appendix.
Nocco (2012) establishes that trade liberalization has a negative impact on
welfare when the degree of vertical linkages is relatively strong as trade liber-
alization increases the price index of the composite good. This is due to the
positive e¤ect that trade liberalization has on the demand for the composite
good, because rmswillingness to become exporters increases. This increases
the costs of surviving and entry, reducing the mass of varieties produced in
equilibrium. In the particular context of the present model, the e¤ect could be
stronger for some cases since, apart from the e¤ect on the mass of varieties,
the increase in the cost of intermediates can have, in certain cases, a negative
impact on technology upgrading.
While the e¤ects of trade liberalization on welfare are qualitatively the same
as in Nocco (2012), this cannot be said from a quantitative point of view. As a
matter of fact, the welfare e¤ects of trade liberalization are exacerbated in this
framework due to the possibility of rms to technology upgrade. Notice that in
Nocco (2012), the equivalent to i is ~ = 1 + 

fX
fD
1 
. Since the e¤ects of
trade liberalization are determined by the elasticity of i to  the following can
be concluded:
Proposition 4 When 0 <  < 1, the increasing welfare e¤ects of trade liber-
alization are larger when technology upgrading is possible.
Proof. See Appendix
This can be easily seen by noticing that the e¤ect of trade liberalization on
welfare clearly depends on i:Note that i is larger in the technology adoption
case. The main reason behind this result lies in the fact that trade liberalization
promotes technology upgrading in equilibria A and C and this subsequently
reduces the price index, having a larger impact on welfare. In equilibrium
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B, trade liberalization, while deterring technology upgrading in certain cases
(i.e. 0 <  < 0), facilitates the replacement of domestic varieties by more
productive foreign ones. This increases welfare.
Technology upgrading, therefore, exacerbates the impact of trade liberal-
ization on welfare in the presence of vertical linkages. The next proposition
suggests that vertical linkages not only does shape the e¤ects of trade liberal-
ization on welfare, as seen above, but in the case in which they are positive,
they also enlarge the impact of trade liberalization on welfare.
Proposition 5 When technology upgrading is possible, the presence of moderate
vertical linkages (0 <  < 1) strenghtens the impact that trade liberalization has
on welfare.
Proof. See Appendix.
The existence of vertical linkages generates a multiplier e¤ect on welfare.
This multiplier e¤ect comes clearly through the general e¤ect of trade lib-
eralization on the price index, which declines with moderate vertical linkages
(0 <  < 1), and the specic e¤ects on selection and technology upgrading
that vary according to the strength of vertical linkages and type of equilibria.
Trade liberalization gives access to more productive foreign varieties. This re-
duces the cost of the composite good M having a positive impact on welfare
and a reduction in the costs of production (through the vertical linkages) having
a further reduction in the aggregate price index. In addition, trade liberaliza-
tion intensies competition expelling the less e¢ cient varieties out of the market
when vertical linkages are weak (0 <  < 0) increasing also the average produc-
tivity of the economy (~a)1 , even though the e¤ect of technology upgrading is
di¤erent across equilibria.15 The higher level of productivity required to survive
in the economy reduces the price of the composite good through the concentra-
tion of production across the most e¢ cient units and, through vertical linkages,
the costs of production. This will produce a further reduction in the aggregate
price index. When vertical linkages are intermediate-low (0 <  < 1), the
larger general e¤ect of the reduction in the price index is sustained by technol-
ogy adoption even though contrasted by a softening in the survival conditions of
rms. In this case, the price index decreases by more either because average pro-
ductivity increases by more (when 0 <  <  =
( 1)2+( 1)
( 1)2+ ), or because
the number of varieties increases by more when the softer conditions required
to survive reduce the average productivity of rms (that is when  <  < 1).
Finally, let us conclude pointing out that when vertical linkages are su¢ -
ciently strong to increase the price index, even if the welfare level decreases due
to a drastic reduction in the mass of varieties, the average productivity of the
economy increases which is mainly driven by tougher selection.
15Computations regarding the weighted average productivity (~a)1  can be found in the
appendix.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the impact of trade liberalization on technology
adoption, average productivity and welfare in a framework in which heteroge-
neous rms that can decide to upgrade the technology they use are intercon-
nected by vertical linkages, a relatively unexplored dimension in the literature.
Our analysis is motivated by the prominent role of intermediate inputs in world
trade and GDP and the importance of industry-specic vertical linkages as doc-
umented in Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009).
We have shown that the inclusion of vertical linkages changes the e¤ects of
trade liberalization on innovation, average productivity and welfare although
its nal impact depends on the strength of vertical linkages, generating a very
rich set of results. When the strength of vertical linkages is low, vertical link-
ages augment the e¤ects of trade liberalization on technology upgrading. When
the strength of vertical linkages are middle-low, instead, trade liberalization in-
creases technology upgrading independently of the parameter conguration. In
this case trade liberalization reduces the survival and innovation costs allow-
ing more rms to stay and to adopt the new technology, which is not present
in a model without vertical linkages. However, when the strength of vertical
linkages is middle-high trade liberalization reduces both technology upgrading
and the industry cuto¤ independently of the parameter conguration. For very
high levels of vertical linkages the e¤ect on innovation depends on the level of
economic integration and other parameters.
These results have a clear impact on average productivity and welfare.
Specically, trade liberalization increases average productivity, except when
 <  < 1. In this case, trade liberalisation promotes technology adoption
but it softens selection. The latter e¤ect dominates contributing to a decrease
in average productivity. We also show that trade liberalisation has a positive
impact on welfare only when vertical linkages are moderate (i.e. 0 <  < 0).
When vertical linkages are strong the reduction in the number of varieties de-
creases utility even if there is an increase in average productivity due to a
stronger selection e¤ect.
Finally, our framework also has implications for the magnitude of the e¤ects
of trade on both welfare and average productivity. More precisely, we have
shown that in the scenarios in which trade liberalization promotes technology
upgrading, the e¤ects on welfare are larger with vertical linkages than in a case
without vertical linkages. We have also shown that in the case in which vertical
linkages are moderate the impact of trade liberalization on average productivity
and welfare is larger when rms are allowed to technology upgrade than in a
case without the opportunity to adopt more productive technologies.
Thus, we conclude that our paper helps to shed some light on the analy-
sis of the relationships that exist among trade liberalization, technology adop-
tion, productivity and welfare changes, showing how its multifaceted nature
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can become even more complex when rms producing in open economies are
interconnected by vertical linkages.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Results in Table I.
This part of the Appendix contains the derivation of the signs of the derivatives
of the cuto¤s with respect to  reported in Table I.
In general, from (13) and (14) it can be derived that
@aiD
@
=     1  

"
L
0fD


   1
1 # 
aMfE
fD
(   1)
 1 
  
i
  1   1 @i
@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Given that @
i
@ > 0, the sign of
@aiD
@ depends on the sign of   1  =
 ( 1)
( 1)(+)  as in Nocco (2012). Hence,
@aiD
@ < 0 for  2 (0; 0) and
 2 (1; 1), and viceversa @a
i
D
@ > 0 for  2 (0; 1) with 0   1 , 1   1
and 0 < 0 < 1 < 1.
Turning to the sign of @a
i
I
@ , it has to be analyzed in detail for each case.
Equilibrium A In equilibrium A, substituting aAD into (4) yields
aAI = z
"
A
   1 
( 1)(+) 

1
1 + 
 1
(1 )
#
where z 


0fD
L


 1
1  (h
fI
fD
1
(1  1)
i ( 1)(+) 
(1 )( 1 ) fE
fD
(   1) aM
) 1 

>
0 does not depend on .
Then,
@aAI
@
=  z

A
   1 
( 1)(+) 

1
1 + 
 1
(1 ) @
A
@
A
(h  l)
and given that z

A
   1 
( 1)(+) 

1
1+
 1
(1 ) @
A
@
A
> 0, the sign of @a
A
I
@ de-
pends on the sign of h  l, where h   1 ( 1)(+)  and l  1( 1) 11+=(
@A
@
A
).
It can be readily veried that l does not depend on  and can be represented
by a horizontal line in the cartesian plane where  is represented on the axis
of abscissas (See Figures 1-2 that follow). Moreover, when the independent
variable is , h is a hyperbola, whose expression can be rewritten as follows
h =  ( 1)[ ( 1)] ( 1) with center in O


 1 ;
1
  ( 1)

, and its two asymp-
totes having, respectively, expressions 1   1 in the case of the vertical
asymptote and h = 1 ( 1)= in that of the horizontal asymptote. Moreover,
it can be veried that: 1) h = 1 when  = 0; 2) h =
1
 ( 1) > 0 (because
 >    1) when  = 1; 3) and, nally, h = 0 when  =  1  0.
Then, substituting
@A
@
A
into l yields
l =
1


1 + 
1 + 

fX
fD
1 
+
 
1    1 (1 + )  fIfD 1 


fX
fD
1 
+ (1    1) (1 + ) 1+

fI
fD
1  > 1
with l < 1 ( 1) for su¢ ciently high levels of international integration, that
is with (fX=)
 1
< (+)( 1) f
 1
D . Otherwise, for low levels of international
integration, that is with (fX=)
 1
> (+)( 1) f
 1
D , we nd that: l <
1
 ( 1)
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if

1
fI
 1
> ( 1) 
(+)
(1  1)(1+)f 1D
with 
  

fX
fD
1 
; and l > 1 ( 1) if
1
fI
 1
< ( 1) 
(+)
(1  1)(1+)f 1D
.
Therefore, there are two potential cases:
Case 6 (1) l < 1 ( 1) when (fX=)
 1
< (+)( 1) f
 1
D or when (fX=)
 1
>
(+)
( 1) f
 1
D and

1
fI
 1
> ( 1) 
(+)
(1  1)(1+)f 1D
. In this case represented in
Figure 1, @a
A
I
@ > 0 when    < 1 as h < l; and @a
A
I
@ < 0 when 1 <  < 1
as h > l.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Case 7 (2) l > 1 ( 1) when (fX=)
 1
> (+)( 1) f
 1
D and

1
fI
 1
< ( 1) 
(+)
(1  1)(1+)f 1D
.
In this case, @a
A
I
@ > 0 when    < 1 and when A2 <  < 1 as h < l; and
@aAI
@ < 0 when 1 <  < 
A
2 as h > l.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Equilibrium C In equilibrium C, substituting aCD into (8) yields
aCI = y

C
   1 
( 1)(+) 

1
(1 + ) 1    1
 1
(1 )
where y 

L
fD0


 1
1  
fX+fI
fD
 1
1 
h
aMfE
fD
(   1)
i 1 

> 0 does not
depend on .
Then,
@aCI
@
=  y

C
   1 
( 1)(+) 

1
(1 + ) 1    1
 1
(1 ) @
C
@
C
(h  lC)
and given that y

C
   1 
( 1)(+) 
h
1
(1+)1  1
i 1
(1 ) @
C
@
C
> 0, the sign of
@aCI
@ depends on the sign of h   lC , where lC  1( 1) 
1 
(1+)1  1=(
@C
@
C
) does
not depend on  and can be represented by an horizontal line in the cartesian
plane where  is represented on the axis of abscissas.
Then, substituting
@C
@
C
into lC yields
lC =
1

1 +

(1 + ) 1    1  fX+fIfD 1 
[(1 + ) 1    1]

fX+fI
fD
1  > 1
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with lC < 1 ( 1) when (fX + fI)
 1
<
[(1+)1  1]
( 1) f
 1
D (Case 1), and
lC >
1
 ( 1) when (fX + fI)
 1
>
[(1+)1  1]
( 1) f
 1
D (Case 2). In Case
1, that is for relatively low (fX + fI) and relatively high levels of economic
integration , @a
C
I
@ > 0 when 0 <  < 1 as h < lC , while
@aCI
@ < 0 when
1 <  < 1 because h > lC . In Case 2, that is for relatively high (fX + fI)
and relatively low levels of economic integration , @a
C
I
@ > 0 when 0 <  < 1
and C2 <  < 1 as h < lC , while
@aCI
@ < 0 when 1 < 1 < 
C
2 , because
h > lC . Notice that the two cases can be represented by similar gures as those
respectively used in Figure 1 and Figure 2, even if the expression of lC should
be used instead of that of l and the value of C2 should be used instead of that
of A2 .
Equilibrium B For the case of equilibriumB, it is clear from (7) that sign(@a
B
I
@ ) =
sign(
@aBD
@ ).
6.2 Proof of propositions.
Proof of Proposition 1 In equilibrium A the economy is in case number
2 if

fX
fD
 1
> (+)( 1) and

fI
fD(1  1)(1+)
 1
>
(1  1)(1+)
(( 1) 
(+)) with 
 =


fX
fD
1 
. Otherwise the economy is in case number 1 (which represents the
continuity from the previous equilibria).
Rearranging terms in the rst of the previous conditions we have that

fX
fD
 1
>
 1 (+)( 1) : The right hand side is increasing in : Since  is upper bounded
by 1 we have that the rst condition is always satised when

fX
fD
 1
>
(+1)
( 1) : Rearranging the second equation and replacing the value of 
, we have
that

fI
fD
 1
>
(1  1)(1+)
( 1) 

fX
fD
1 
(+) 1
: This expression is also increasing
in : Since  is upper bounded by 1 we have that the second condition is
always satised when

fI
fD
 1
>
(1  1)2
( 1) 

fX
fD
1 
(+1)
: Notice that from (4)
fI
fD(1  1)(1+)
 1
> 1 must be satised for equilibrium A to hold. This
implies that if
(1  1)(1+)
(( 1) 
(+)) < 1 for any value of  this condition will be
always sustained independently of the value of : Making use of the expression
for 
 and rearranging terms we have that for the previous condition to hold 
1    1 <

( 1) 

fX
fD
1 
 1(+)

(1+) : Notice that this expression is decreas-
ing in : Evaluating the rhs under  = 0 we have that:
 
1    1 < (   1) :
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If this condition holds, then

fI
fD
 1
>
(1  1)(1+)
( 1) 

fX
fD
1 
(+) 1
for any value
of :
Proof of Proposition 2 The equation governing the conditions under which
the economy will be in either case 1 or 2 is the following:
If
n
(fI+fX)
[(1+)1  1]fD
o 1
> (1+)
1  1
 1 ; the economy is in case 2, otherwise
the economy is in case 1 (provided that
n
(fI+fX)
[(1+)1  1]fD
o 1
> 1 which is
required from (8) for being in equilibrium C).
Rearranging terms we nd that for the former condition to hold the fol-
lowing must be satised:
h
(fI+fX)
fD
i 1
>
[(1+)1  1]
 1 :Notice that the right
hand side of this condition is increasing in . Because  is bounded above
and below, evaluating the rhs of that condition when  = 1 we have that
if
h
(fI+fX)
fD
i 1
>
(21  1)
 1 ; then
h
(fI+fX)
fD
i 1
>
[(1+)1  1]
 1 for any
 ( we are in case 2 independently of ). Consider the reverse constrainth
(fI+fX)
fD
i 1
<
[(1+)1  1]
 1 (this is the condition for being in case 1). Evalu-
ating the right hand side when  = 0 we have that if
h
(fI+fX)
fD
i 1
< (
1  1)
 1
then

(fI+fX)
fD
 1
<
((1+)1  1)
 1 for any : The economy is in case 1
independently of the value of :
Proof of Proposition 3 Deriving expression (11) with respect to  we notice
that:
sign
@P iM
@
= sign
 
1  

 
@i
@
!!
where we know that @
i
@ < 0 since
@i
@ =
@i
@|{z}
+
@
@|{z}
 
< 0. The sign of the deriva-
tive of the price index is clearly depending on the sign of 1  , and given that
expression (1  ) is always negative, the sign of @P iM@ ultimately depends on
the sign of  that depends on the value of . More precisely, if  < 1 then  is
positive, while  is negative if  > 1. Consequently, we obtain that, no matter
the equilibrium in which we are, @P
i
M
@ < 0 if  < 1 and
@P iM
@ > 0 if  > 1:
Proof of Proposition 4 To show this, rst notice that in a model with
technology adoption the welfare e¤ect of trade liberalization is given by: @P
i
M
@ =
1 

@i
@
@
@ . In a model without technology upgrading we have that the e¤ect
of technology adoption on welfare is given by: @P
i
M
@ =
1 

@~
@
@
@ with
~ =
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1 +

fX
fD
1 
: Since we have that @
i
@ > 0,
@~
@ > 0, and the other two factors
1 
 and
@
@ are identical in both models, the e¤ect will be larger in a model
with technology adoption when @(
i ~)
@ > 0. Then, let us analyze the three
specic equilibria.
EquilibriumA. In equilibriumA, i = 1+

fX
fD
1 
+
 
1    1 (1 + )  fIfD 1  .
Since ~ = 1+

fX
fD
1 
, then we have that i ~ =  1    1 (1 + )  fIfD 1  >
0 increases when  increases. Consequently the impact on welfare is larger in
the model with technology upgrading.
EquilibriumB. In equilibriumB, i = 1+

1 
  fX
fD
1 
+

1    1  fIfD 1  .
In this case, we have that: i ~ = (1 )   1  fXfD 1 + 1    1  fIfD 1  >
0 increases when  increases since (1  ) =   is negative and  2 [0; 1].
Equilibrium C. In equilibrium C, i = 1+
 
(1 + ) 1    1  fX+fIfD 1  .
Di¤erentiating with respect to  we have that @
i
@ = 

(1 + ) 1    1 1 1   fX+fIfD 1  >
0, and @
~
@ = 
 1

fX
fD
1 
> 0. The third term of the rst derivative is larger
than one and the fourth term is larger than the third term of the second deriv-
ative. To ensure that @
i
@ is larger than
@~
@ , so that 
i   ~ increases when 
increases, we need to compare

(1 + ) 1    1 1 and  1. Given that
 > 1, both these two elements have a positive exponent. Then we have that:
(1 + ) 1    1 >  if (1 + )  1    1 > 0 which is the case, also ensuring
that i   ~ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5 Consider rst the case with no technology adoption
and compare the two models with and without vertical linkages. The e¤ect of
trade on welfare in the model without vertical linkages is determined by the
e¤ect on the aggregate price index which is given by: @P

M
@ =   1

@~
@

. ~ is not
a¤ected by vertical linkages and, consequently, it will take the same value in the
model with vertical linkages. The e¤ect of trade liberalization on welfare in
this case is larger in the model with vertical linkages if the following inequality
holds  1 >
1
 )  (   1) > ) 0 > (   1)  )  >  1)  > 1 ,
which is the case since  > 1 and  > 1.
The same line of reasoning applies in a case in which we consider that rms
have the possibility to technology upgrade in both models but vertical linkages
are only present in one of them. In that case i instead of ~ will be common
across both models. But the di¤erence in the e¤ect of trade liberalization on
welfare clearly depends on the same inequality as in the previous case which
clearly holds.
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6.3 Average productivity
The aggregate price index can be expressed as
P iM =
 
N iD
 1
1  p(~ai) =
 
N iD
 1
1 


   1
 
P iM

~ai
that can be rewritten as
P iM =
 
N iD
 1
(1 )(1 )


   1
 1
1   
~ai
 1
1 
The previous expression together with equation (13) yields average productivity
as follows  
~ai
1 
=


   1

i
 
aiD
1 
The impact of trade liberalization can be assessed analyzing how a change
in variable trade barriers a¤ect average productivity. Notice that a reduction in
trade barriers will have a positive e¤ect on i . However it has an ambiguous
e¤ect on aiD depending on the value of . More precisely we have that
@
 
~ai
1 
@
=
@
 
~ai
1 
@i
@i
@
where @
i
@ < 0. The rst term is given by:
@
 
~ai
1 
@i
=


   1
 
aiD
1  "
1 +
@
 
aiD
1 
@i
i 
aiD
1 
#
=
=


   1
 
aiD
1  
1  (1  ) (   1  )


Notice that the sign of this derivative depends on the last factor in the squared
brackets. More precisely the sign of
@(~ai)
1 
@i
is positive when
(   1) (   1  )
(   1) (+ )   >  1 (15)
and negative otherwise. Notice that the denominator   ( 1) (+ ) 
is positive when  2 [0; 1) and negative when  2 (1; 1). Hence, it can be
shown that if  2 [0; 1), @(~a
i)
1 
@i
> 0 if  2 [0; ) with   ( 1)2+( 1)( 1)2+ ,
and
@(~ai)
1 
@i
< 0 if  2 (; 1). If, instead,  2 (1; 1),  is negative and
given that both the numerator and the denominator of (15) are negative, the
inequality in (15) is always true and hence the sign of
@(~ai)
1 
@i
is always positive.
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